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MARKET IMPERFECTIONS: ENFORCEMENT
OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS IN A
FRICTION-AFFLICTED ECONOMY
G. E. Halet and Rosemary D. Halett
INTRODUCTION
In analyzing the nature of monopoly economists distinguish be-
tween market "impurities" and "imperfections." "Pure" competition
is a simple concept: there must be many buyers and many sellers, no
one of whom can affect prices. Since the sales or purchases of each
trader are small, each seller is faced with a perfectly elastic demand
curve for his product.' A second requirement of market "purity" is
that the commodity must be homogeneous.' When the two foregoing
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1. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 7 (5th ed. 1946);
Chamberlin, Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?, 51 Q.J. EcoN. 557, 566 (1937)
ROBINSON, THE EcONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPErION 88-9 (1936); Robinson,
What Is Perfect Competition?, 49 Q.J. EcoN. 104, 105 (1934) ; Machlup, Monopoly
and Competition: A Classification of Market Positions, 27 Am. EcoN. REv. 445, 451
(1937); TRIFFiN, MONOPOLISTIC CO MPETITION AND GENERAL EguILiBRIum THEORY
138 (1940). Cf. Kaldor, Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect Coin-
petition, 52 Q.J. EcoN. 513, 516 (1938).
2. CHAmBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION C. 1 (5th ed. 1946);
Machlup, Monopoly and Competition: A Classification of Market Positions, 27
Am. EcoN. REv. 445, 448 (1937). Difficulty in defining commodities has been, of
course, a major problem in the attempt to achieve "pure" competition. Hale, Size
and Shape, 1950 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 515, 525.
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conditions for "purity" have been achieved, all monopoly elements
have been removed from the market.
"Perfect" competition is a residual concept. All obstacles to
an economic allocation of resources other than monopoly are referred
to as "imperfections." ' Time lags, immobility of capital and labor,
ignorance on the part of producer or consumer, and irrational deci-
sions by buyers and sellers are prominent examples of "imperfections." 4
As we shall see, commodities must also be homogeneous in order
to avoid market "imperfections;" thus there is an overlap between
the concepts of "purity" and "perfection." '
This study examines the nature of imperfections and suggests
their application in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws.' In a free
3. HANEY, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, 695 (4th ed. 1949); CHAMBERLIN,
THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 6, 206 (5th ed. 1946); Machlup,
Monopoly and Competition: A Classification of Market Positions, 27 Am. EcoN.
REV. 445 (1937); KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 76-9 (1921).
4. As stated by Professor Knight, the condition of perfect competition:
. assumes complete absence of physical obstacles to the making, execution and
changing of plans at will; that is there must be 'perfect mobility' in all economic
adjustments, no costs involved in movements or changes. To realize this ideal all
the elements entering into economic calculations-effort, commodities, etc.-must be
continuously variable, divisible without limit. Productive operations must not form
habits, preferences, or aversions, or develop or reduce the capacity to perform them.
In addition the production process must be constantly and continuously complete;
there is no time cycle of operations to be broken into or left incomplete by sudden
readjustments. Each person continuously produces a complete commodity which
is consumed as fast as produced. The exchange of commodities must be virtually
instantaneous and costless." Id. at 128. Cf. HANKY, VALUE AND DISTRmUTION
149 (1939). Imperfections prevent application of the "profits" test to determine the
existence of monopoly. High profits, in other words, may reflect merely frictions
in the market place and not monopoly power. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND
PROFITS 19 (1921) ; Machlup, Monopoly and Competition: A Classification of
Market Positions, 27 Am. ECON. REv. 445, 448 (1937); Robinson, What Is Perfect
Competition?, 49 Q.J. ECON. 104, 107 (1934).
5. Differentiation of products is a way of avoiding pure competition. Hence the
existence of homogeneous commodities is a necessary condition of purity. CHAMBER-
LIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 7 (5th ed. 1946) ; ROBINSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 90 (1936); TRIFFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPK-
TITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY 133 (1940); SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 492 (1st ed. 1948); HANEY, VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION
146 n. (1939). Cf. Kaldor, Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect
Competition, 52 Q.J. ECON. 513, 517 (1938). Many subtle forms of product differen-
tiation impair commodity homogeneity. Delivery service, extension of credit and the
privilege of returning merchandise are three prominent examples. ROBINSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 89, 90 (1936) ; Copeland, Competing Products
and Monopolistic Competition, 55 Q.J. ECON. 1, 30 (1940). Standardization of com-
modities is also important in the concept of "perfect" competition. Without such
standards it is impossible for buyers to identify what they are paying for. Id. at
32. Cf. LYON, THE A.B.C. OF THE N.R.A. 173, 174, 177, 178 (1934) (Code provisions
under the N.R.A.). Such standardization, however, can be carried so far as to
deny consumers any real choice. At that point there may be conflict between the re-
quirements of "purity" and "perfection" and of consumer sovereignty. Chamberlin,
Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?, 51 Q.J. EcoN. 557, 577 (1937) ; STOCKING
AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 508 (1951).
6. The basic federal statute is the Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1946). Supplementary legislation is collected in the first part of
title 15 of the United States Code. Similar legislation exists in most
of the states and was collected in W.P.A., STATE ANTI-TRUST LAWS (Martin ed.
1940). The common law of the several states should also be considered.
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market economy allocation of resources is guided by consumer demand.
Frictions and imperfections which reduce mobility of capital and labor
or cloud the reign of consumer sovereignty may be just as injurious
to the economy as monopoly itself.7 In addition, such frictions and
imperfections may themselves give rise to a degree of monopoly power:
if Ivory is the only brand of soap known to a housewife, its maker
can monopolize her trade.' This paper suggests that in some instances
monopoly elements in effect merely eliminate imperfections which
may be more disruptive to the economy than the impurities which
they create. In any anti-trust case, therefore, not only the monopolistic
tendencies, but also the imperfections which they tend to remove must
be examined and weighed in order to obtain an economically sound
result.
THE NATURE OF MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
Indivisibility and immobility are obvious imperfections. A town
may not be large enough to support a second theater. Workers may
hesitate to leave family and friends in order to secure higher wages
in a distant area.' Space itself is an imperfection 10 and likewise gives
rise to part of the problem of mobility." Similarly, time lags prevent
7. Lindhahl, The Federal Trade Commission Act as Amended in 1938, 47 J.
POL. EcoN. 497, 504 (1939) ; GARNER AND HANSEN, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNwoIcs 58 (3d
ed. 1947). Imperfections may seriously distort the economy. Machlup, Monopoly
and Competition: A Classification of Market Positions, 27 Am. ECON. REv. 445, 451
(1937). Consumer sovereignty is, of course, also thwarted by monopoly. Hilde-
brand, Consumer Sovereignty In Modern Times, 41 AM. EcON. REv. 19, 21 (Supp.
1951) (Proceedings American Economic Association).
8. Robinson, What Is Perfect Competition?, 49 Q.J. EcoN. 104, 106 (1934);
LYoN AND ABRAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN PRICE SYST'EMS 64 (1936);
BORDEN, THE ECONoMIc EFFECTS OF ADVERTiSING 182 (1942); Wright, Toward
Coherent Anti-Trust, 35 VA. L. REv. 665, 678 (1949).
9. Cf. KNIGHT, Risx, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 177 (1921); Chamberlin,
Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?, 51 Q.J. EcoN. 557, 564-5, (1937) ; HANEY,
VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION 151 (1939); WILCOX, COM.PETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AMERCAN INDUSTRY 2 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940); Gregory, Fashion and
Monopolistic Competition, 56 J. POL. EcoN. 69, 73 (1948). Such imperfections are
often equivalent to those economies of scale which stand in the way of "pure"
competition. Kaldor, Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect Compe-
tition, 52 Q.J. EcoN. 513, 521 (1938). Query whether differences in managerial
ability should be considered imperfections. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945), one of the elements of monopolization
mentioned was that the defendant had kept the elite of personnel in its industry
available for production of its goods. Note also, the following statement: "Small
business by its very nature-the low financial requirements, easy entry, attractive-
ness to the individual-invites entrants without management experience while it is
usually unable to contain within itself the elements of good management in the way
of accountants, financial experts, fact finding, and so on." Wexman, Financial Ad-
vice and Guidance for Small Business, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 336 (1945).
10. Stated differently: The fact that all economic activity does not occur at one
place is in itself an imperfection.
11. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 324-5 (8th ed. 1922); KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 79 (1921); ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFET
COMPETITION 89 (1936); GARVER AND HANSEN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 61 (3d
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a perfect allocation of resources: even though a new product is not
protected by patent some delay normally ensues before the innovatol
is challenged by competition. 2
Inertia is an important imperfection.' 3 Many economic decisions
are the result of habit and custom rather than rational choice. We
do not and we could not pause to re-examine every day the quality
of the commodities which we buy. 4 The man who has always driven
a Buick may purchase another car of that make to save an afternoon
of shopping around for his game of golf. Closely akin to inertia
are the emotional barriers to a free flow of resources. 5 Sectional,
ed. 1947); Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 EcoN. J. 41, 44 (1929); Lerner
and Singer, Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial Competition, 45 J. POL. EcoN. 145,
186 (1937); WEINTRAUB, PUCE THEORY 277, 278, 285 (1949); Smithies, Optimum
Location in Spatial Competition, 49 J. POL. EcoN. 423, 434 (1941) ; Copeland, Com-
peting Products and Monopolistic Competition, 55 Q.J. EcoN. 1, 29 (1940). From
another point of view, the factor of space simply differentiates products and hence
constitutes an impurity rather than an imperfection. Hale, Size and Shape, 1950
U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 515, 518, 527; Enke, Space and Value, 56 Q.J. EcoN. 627, 637
(1942) ; Sraffa, The. Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 EcoN. J.
535, 544 (1926); Chamberlin, Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?, 51 Q.J. ECON.
557, 562 (1937); Lerner and Singer, Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial Competi-
tion, 45 J. POL. ECON. 145 (1937) ; WEINTRAUB, PRICE THEORY 272, 284 n. (1949).
For a discussion of how competitors behave in relation to the impurity or imper-
fection of space see Copeland, Competing Products and Monopolistic Competition,
55 Q.J. EcoN. 1, 29 (1940) ; Lerner and Singer, Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial
Competition, 45 J. POL. EcoN. 145, 151, 154 (1937) ; Smithies, Optimum Location
in Spatial Competition, 49 J. POL. ECON. 423, 430, 432, 436 (1941). Retail market
areas, of course, vary in size and economic importance. WAITE AND CASSADY, THE
CONSUMER AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 234 (1939).
12. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 330 (8th ed. 1922); HANEY, HISTORY
OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 707 (4th ed. 1949); WILcox, COMn'ETITON AND MONOPOLY
IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 2 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940); WAITE AND CASSADY,
THE CONSUMER AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 254 n. (1939); CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 6 (5th ed. 1946); BuRNs, THE DECLINE OF
COMPETITION 29 (1936). Some variations in price on a seasonal or other basis re-
flect changes in demand rather than imperfections. The August fur sale, the higher
price of hair cuts on Saturday and the lower telephone rates available in the evenings
are examples of such changes in demand corresponding to time periods. OXENFELDr,
INDUSTRAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 240 (1951). The passage of time is
important, however, to a study of monopoly proper even though most observers to
date have contented themselves with "static" analyses. HANEY, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 709, 713 (4th ed. 1949) ; Chamberlin, An Experimental Imperfect Market,
56 J. POL. ECON. 95, 108 (1948).
13. RoBINSoN, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 89 (1936); HANEY,
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 702 (4th ed. 1949).
14. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 210 (1921); GORDON, ECONOMICS
FOR CONSUMERS 7, 66 (2d ed. 1944) ; Mack, Economics of Consumption in A SURVEY
OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 42 (Haley ed. 1952). A vivid illustration of the force of
habit is found in consumers' attachment to particular brands of goods. OXENFELDT,
INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 140 n. 64, 146 (1951). But cf.
Nichol, Edgeworth's Theory of Duopoly Price, 45 ECON. J. 51, 62-3 (1935);
Roper, The Fortune Consoner Outlook, 40 FORTUNE 57, 60 (Sept. 1950). The very
notion that consumers may exercise freedom of choice is a modern one. In earlier ages
consumer sovereignty was unknown and even the amount of food to be eaten by the
citizenry was prescribed closely by governmental decree. GoRDoN, ECONOMICS FOR
CONSUMERS 599 (2d ed. 1944).
15. Differences in tastes vary greatly among consumers. Mack, Economics of
Consumption in A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 62, 63 (Haley ed. 1952);
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 89 (1936). Unequal distribu-
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social, family and religious considerations make markets rigid. Racial
prejudice warps employment and other transactions. Hopes and
habits, customs and conventions often prevent consumers from acting
in a manner which others might consider rational."0
Government action in the nature of intervention-control over
prices and the rationing of commodities-should be considered as an
impurity." Other types of governmental action may, however, well
result in imperfections. Thus taxes levied on particular products
such as gasoline and cigarettes tend to distort consumer demand
for those commodities.' 8 In the short run, police power regulation
tion of income is, of course, responsible for a large part of (but not all) taste variations.
Mack, Economics of Consumption in A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 40,
45, 53, 55, 63-4, 67, 68, 71 (Haley ed. 1952). Consumers are often motivated by a
desire for display and to acquire the latest fashions. GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR
CONSUmERS 64, 98, 291 (2d ed. 1944); BORDEN, THE EcoNo Ic EFFECTS OF ADVER-
TISING 655 (1942); HOYT, CONSUMPTION IN OUR Society 78 (1938); Gregory,
Fashion and Monopolistic Competition, 56 J. PoL ECON. 69, 70 (1948) (pointing
out the relationship between fashion and that product differentiation which character-
izes monopolistic competition). Cf. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78
(1934); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.
1943) (quoting FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., supra). Some commodities are sold
in conventionalized price "lines" which are maintained even when competition takes
the form of changes in quality. NELSON AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINE.SS
POLICY 75 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1941).
16. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 78 (1921); Boulding, Welfare
Economics in A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 31 (Haley ed. 1952) ; Mitchell,
The Backward Art of Spending Money in AMERICAN STANDARDS AND PLANES OF
LIVING 377, 388 (Eliot ed. 1931); Mack, Economics of Consumption in A SURvEy
OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS (Haley ed. 1952) ; Galbraith, Rational and Irrational
Consumer Preference, 48 EcoN. J. 336 (1938) ; GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS
43, 70, 72, 291, 507 (2d ed. 1944). Even on the assumption that consumers act
purely "rationally" many imperfections must be recognized. Thus it has been said:
" . .Consumers tend to choose wisely, but because they have so many alternatives
before them they need help in discriminating on the actual market. We have only
24 hours a day, and we cannot spend the whole 24 weighing potatoes, burning
silk, experimenting with coffee grinders and feeding guinea pigs." HOYT, CoN-
SUMPTION IN OUR Socl=r 79 (1938). Another observer said: ". . . To learn
really to select wisely among the many items in order to build a program of con-
sumption would be a life's work. To learn, in addition, to choose the best value
among the many qualities in which each item is offered at different prices would
take the proverbial nine lives of a cat. . . ." Vaile, Consumption, The End Result
of Marketing, 209 ANNALS 14, 21 (1940).
17. Statutes illustrating this type of government action are: 49 STAT. 543 et seq.
(1946), as amended, 54 STAT. 919 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §301 et seq. (1946) (Part II of
the Interstate Commerce Act) ; 52 STAT. 977 et seq. (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq. (Supp. 1951) (Civil Aeronautics Act); 49 STAT. 2036-9 (1936), as
amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-41 (Supp. 1951) (Walsh-Healey Act). See Fisher, Anti-
Trust During National Emergencies, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 1167 (1942); Hale,
Principles of Free Enterprise, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 186, 193 (1941) ; Hale,
Monopoly and Mobilization: The Conflict Between Direct Control and the Anti-
trust Laws, 47 NORTHWESTERN U.L. REV. 606 (1952). Cf. Sargent, Economic
Hazards in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 422, 429 (1939).
But cf. CHAxMERLI N, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 47 (5th ed. 1946).
18. See INT. REV. CODE §§ 2000, 2800, 3250. Steeply progressive income taxes
may impair incentives and hence constitute imperfections. Stigler, The Economics
of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 Am. EcoN. REv. 358, 364 (1946); Boughner,
Methods of Reducing Excess Profits Taxes, 32 CHI. BAR RECORD 453, 456 (1951).
Restraints have sometimes been imposed upon the extension of credit. Federal Re-
serve System Regulation No. 10, 16 FED. REG. 1586 (1951) (Regulation 10, Real
Estate Credit). It is not clear whether such restrictions should be regarded as
market imperfections.
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designed to protect public health and safety "9 may have some similar
effect. A statute requiring theatres to be constructed with a minimum
number of fire exits may make it more expensive to erect such struc-
tures and hence discourage entry. In the long run, however, statutes
designed in good faith 2 to protect public health and safety should
not be considered imperfections because the barriers which they create
will be counter-balanced by subsequent savings to society. In such
instances the burden of regulation can be justified if the counter-
vailing savings actually exist. Contrariwise, even statutes designed
to protect investors from fraud 2 ' may be administered in such a
manner as to handicap small and growing business 2 to the point
where resources are allocated imperfectly.
IGNORANCE, THE GRAND IMPERFECTION
Lack of knowledge is surely the most important imperfection
and perhaps the underlying cause of the others listed above. Upon
the part of producers, ignorance of demand and costs is the most
damaging.3 A taxi driver sinks the savings of a lifetime in a chicken
19. Examples of this type of regulation are: 49 STAT. 546, 557 et seq. (1935),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) (2), 315 et seq. (1946); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 95Y2,
§ 240 et seq. (1949) (Truck Act); 52 STAT. 977 et seq. (1938), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Supp. 1951); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 127Y2, § 6 et seq. (1949)
(Fires-Investigation and Prevention). See Brownfield, Compulsory Liability In-
surance for Commercial Motor Vehicles, 3 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 571, 574 (1936);
1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 245, 248 (1931).
20. It is a common-place, of course, that police power regulation may be di-
verted to interventionist ends. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 313 (1949);
cf. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953). Many
statutes fall near the border line. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48, § 36 (Supp. 1952)
(semi-monthly payment of wages) ; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 74, § 1 et seq. (1949) (regula-
tion of rate of interest). For the history of statutes regulating hours of work and
the like, see REISENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 598 et seq.
(1950).
21. E.g., 17 CoDE FED. REGS. § 240.14a (1949) (SEC, Regulations X-14).
22. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power, Part 2-A, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 468 (1950). Friends of the
Securities and Exchange Commission have attempted to minimize the impact of its
regulation upon small business. Id. at 686-8; Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 246-7
(1951). Practitioners familiar with the field have not been impressed by the com-
mission's defense. Cf. Margraf, Does Securities Regulation Hinder Financing Small
Business?, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 302, 308 (1945); BURNS, THE DECLINE
OF COMPETITION 419 (1936). Other examples of police power regulation which may
handicap small business are found in the fields of sanitation, small loan regulation,
control of insurance company investments and the like. MATTHEWS, GUINEA PIGS
No MORE 138 (1936); ROBINSON AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN
BUSINESS 120, 135, 174 (1935); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 73, §737(l)(h), (3), (4)(a)
(Insurance Code). Complicated tax legislation may have a similar effect, e.g., INT.
REv. CODE § 165; KAPLAN, SIMALL BUSINESS: ITS PLACE AND PROBLEM 68, 106,
174 (1948). As Professor Kaplan suggests, legislation of a manifestly interventionist
type places a particularly heavy burden upon small and growing business. Hale,
Monopoly and Moblization: The Conflict Between Direct Controls and the Anti-
trust Laws, 47 NORTHWESTERN U.L. REv. 608, 614 (1952).
23. For a detailed analysis of the problem mentioned in the text see KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 86, 198, 213, 225, 226, 230, 252, 253, 254, 260, 263
(1921). Many observers have recognized the problem, e.g., PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS
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farm; but his location is too distant from urban markets to permit
profitable operation.24  At great effort an inventor develops a method
of fixing nitrogen only to find that the cost of manufacture by his
process is prohibitive.
Consumer ignorance is a far more important cause of market
imperfections.25 Faced with a vast selection of goods and imprisoned
by prejudice, habit and emotion, it is next to impossible for the average
consumer to buy intelligently.2" Family units are not sufficiently
large and their requirements are too varied to allow a detailed in-
vestigation of all the goods purchased. Exhaustive laboratory tests
are necessary to determine the relative merits of goods offered in the
market place.2" Even governmental and industrial buyers are not
always able to determine precisely which product is the most satis-
factory.29 As a result, correlation between price and quality is often
loose.30 Rain boots selling for eighty-eight cents a pair were found
OF WELFARE 356 (4th ed. 1932); SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 38-9 (Ist ed. 1948); OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET
PRACTICES 123 (1951); LYON AND ABRAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN PRICE
SYSTEMS 7 (1936). For an example of ignorance even upon the part of large busi-
ness men see The Scrap Men, 39 FORTUNE 80, 88 (Jan. 1949).
24. Marketing research has now been refined to a point where it is able to give
producers considerable help in determining the nature of consumer demand. Testing
devices indicate the preferences of consumers for various types of products and the
marketing methods which will be most effective. See BROWN, MARKETING AND
DIsTRIBUTIoN RESEARCH 16 (1949) ; Cowan, The Function of Management in Market-
ing, 209 ANNALS 71, 74 (1940). It appears likely, however, that marketing re-
search is employed only by large and perhaps medium size firms. Small producers
appear not to have utilized such techniques. Smith, Increasing Distribution Efficiency
by Better Organized Research, 17 J. MARKETING 233, 234 (1953); OXENFELDT, IN-
DUSTRIAL. PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 130 (1951); Mulvihill, Marketing
Research for the Small Company, 16 J. MARKETING 179 (1951). Cf. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 254 (1921).
25. SORENSON, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 8-9 (1941).
26. Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money in AMERICAN STANDARDS
AND PLANES OF LIVING 377, 380 (Eliot ed. 1931); HOYT, CONSUMTION IN OUR
SocIETY 78, 109 (1938); Haley, Value and Distribution in A SURVEY OF CONTEM-
PORARY ECONOMICS 1, 6 (Ellis ed. 1948) ; Alderson, The Consumer Market-Income,
Expenditure and Saving, 209 ANNALS 1 (1940).
27. Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money in AMERICAN STANDARDS
AND PLANES OF LIVING 377, 379 (Eliot ed. 1931) ; Edwards, Competition in Selling
Consumer Goods in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS #4, 353, 359 (Cahn ed.
1952); ROBINSON AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINESS 89
(1935) (old-time loan "sharks" operated in secrecy).
28. NELSON AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 60 (TNEC Mono-
graph 1, 1941) ; cf. GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 8, 12, 221 (2d ed. 1944).
Just as names are convenient to identify persons, uniform labels for commodities
are important to the exercise of rational choice by consumers. See KAIDANOVSKY,
CONSUMER STANDARDS 141, 339 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941).
29. Id. at 167. Cf. NELSON AND KEim, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 68
(TNEC Monograph 1, 1941).
30. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 69 (1951); Chase and Schlink,
Consumers in Wonderland in AMERICAN STANDARDS AND PLANES OF LIVING 804,
806 (Eliot ed. 1931); NELSON AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY
78 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1941); Oxenfeldt, Consumer Knowledge: Its Measure-
ment and Extent, 32 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 300 (1950) ; STEWART AND DEWHURST,
DOES DISTRIBUTION COST Too MUCH? 310 (1939); Hearings before Temporary Na-
tional Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3322 (1939).
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better than another brand of the same commodity retailing for $1.85.1
Product differentiation and the difficulty of evaluating credit, delivery
and installation services render it almost impossible for the domestic
consumer to achieve rational results in buying.
32
Advertising is frequently seen as an important cause of consumer
ignorance and hence of imperfections in the market place.' Adver-
tising assists in the differentiation of otherwise identical commodities
and thus permits sellers to discriminate among groups of buyers.
Identical goods are sold to different groups at widely varying prices
when advertised under different trade-marks.3 4 So heavy have been
the expenditures for advertising of cigarettes and tooth paste and
so great is the attachment of consumers to the established brands 5
that it has become more difficult and expensive for new producers to
31. Rainboots for Women, 30 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL. 17, 18 (Aug. 1952).
See also The New Carpets, 30 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL. 13, 16, 17 (Sept. 1952) ;
Vacuum Cleaners, 30 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL. 5, 8-9 (Nov. 1952) ; 1952 Automo-
biles, 29 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Buu. 5, 6 (June 1952) ; Hearings before Temporary
National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3331 (1939); BORDEN,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 305 (1942). Indeed, observers have often
noted that consumers frequently take price as an index of quality: the hiiher the
price the better the quality. Corey, Pair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 30 HARv.
Bus. REV. No. 5, 47, 52 (Sept.-Oct. 1952) ; cf. GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS
13 (2d ed. 1944); cf. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 89
(1936). Price reductions are sometimes avoided for fear that buyers, ignorant of
quality, will assume a deterioration has taken place in manufacture. Edwards,
Competition in Selling Consumer Goods in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEITS
#4, 353, 361 (Calm ed. 1952).
32. Cf. Mack, Economics of Consumption in A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY
ECONOMICS 61 (Haley ed. 1952) ; Oxenfeldt, Consumer Knowledge: Its Measurement
and Extent, 32 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 300, 313 (1950). However, it has proven
difficult or imposible to determine the quantitative importance of the problem. Ibid.
Consumer ignorance can have broad effects upon the economy generally. It raises
questions as to the whole doctrine of consumer sovereignty. See id. at 312, 313;
Hildebrand, Consumer Sovereignty in Modern Times, 41 Am. EcoN. REv. 19, 21
(Supp. 1951) (Proceedings American Economic Association); Clark, An Appraisal
of Certain Criticisms of Advertising, 15 AM. Ecox. REv. 5, 13 (Supp. 1925) (Pro-
ceedings American Economic Association); GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS
7, 13 (2d ed. 1944). As to the relationship between consumer ignorance and
standardization suggested in the text see WILcox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 2 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940); Montgomery, Consumer
Standards and Marketing, 209 ANNALS 141, 143 (1940); EDWARDS, MAINTAINING
COMPETITION 33 (1949); Hearings before Temporary National Economic Coin-
mittee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3346 (1939).
33. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 185 (1921); NELSON AND KEIM,
PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 55 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1941); Brown,
Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171, 1173 (1948) ; BORDEN,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS Or ADVERTISING 21, 322 (1942).
34. See NELSON AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 80 (TNEC
Monograph 1, 1941); Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly and the Restraint of
Competition, 14 LAW & CONTEM.P. PROB. 323, 341 (1949) ; Hearings before Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, Serial 12, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 462 (1952). But cf., KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PRoFrrs 262
(1921). From time to time the courts have had to determine whether a brand
designation distinguished otherwise identical commodities. Hale, Size and Shape,
1950 U. oF ILL. L. FORUM 515, 525.
35. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS or WELFARE 356 (4th ed. 1932); OxENFELDT, IN-
DUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 140 (1951); GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR
CONSUMERS 253 (2d ed. 1944).
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
enter those fields3 Finally, it is urged that advertising, when not
downright dishonest and misleading, 7 appeals to the emotions 38 more
than the intellect and hence contributes to the irrationality of consumer
behavior.39 If the seller of a face cream does not promise to rejuvenate
beauties faded with the passage of years, he may nevertheless murmur
sweet nothings in their ears until his product is on their faces.4"
36. Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3399 (1939). As to the existence of monopolistic profits in such
situations compare NELSON AND KEir, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 81
(TNEC Monograph 1, 1941) with BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING
175, 176 (1942). As stated in the text, heavy advertising expenditures can raise
barriers to entry into competition. STEWART AND DEWHURST, DOES DISTRIBUTION
COST Too MuCH? 227 (1939); OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET
PRACnCES 283 (1951); STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE
75, 164 (1951); SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 71, 72 (1948);
BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 859 (1942). Such advertising may
also force competitors into defensive and retaliatory measures of the same type.
OXENFELD?, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 224 (1951). Note, for
example, the following comment appearing in an annual report: ". . . Quality of
product, although all important, is only a starting point. Unless the consumer is
repeatedly convinced through advertising and merchandising, as well as by experience,
that the Company's products offer the best value, sales volume will drop." THE
BEST FOODS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 5 (August 15, 1951). It is probably true,
however, that the foregoing effects of advertising operate only in the short run.
BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 860 (1942).
37. Compare BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 808 (1942).
38. BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 604 (1942); OXENFELDT,
INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 205 (1951); GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR
CONSUMERS 182-3 (2d ed. 1944).
39. It is argued that advertising is merely persuasive and not informative and
that trade-marks are not a scientific mechanism to identify product quality. Clark,
An Appraisal of Certain Criticisms of Advertising, 15 Am. ECON. REV. 5 (Supp. 1925)
(Proceedings American Economic Association); ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
IMPERFECT COMPETITION 90 (1936); NOURSE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY 248
(1944) ; Wilcox, Brand Names, Quality and Price, 173 ANNALS 80, 82 (1934). Ad-
vertising is often designed merely to catch the attention of consumers so that they
may receive a message of persuasion. Thus a cigarette manufacturer may employ
well-known theatrical performers for its radio broadcasts simply to assure a large
audience for its "commercial." See, e.g., P. LORILLARD COMPANY, 1950 ANNUAL
REPORT 13 et seq.
40. See Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corporation v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d
Cir. 1944). It is sometimes argued that advertising can actually create demand.
E.g., Shove, The Imperfection of the Market, 43 EcoN. J. 113, 124 (1933). Such a
view would compel sweeping revision of the whole theory of consumer sovereignty.
Stocking, Modern Advertising and Economic Theory, 21 Am. ECON. REv. 43, 44,
50, 53 (1931). But see Hotchkiss, An Economic Defense of Advertising, 15 Am.
Ecox. REv. 14-6 (Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American Economic Association).
Similarly, it is sometimes urged that advertising can shift consumer demand from
one brand or product to another. E.g., Mack, Economics of Consumption in A
SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOmICs 59 (Haley ed. 1952). It is often urged that
such advertising is merely persuasive and hence wasteful in character. Brown, Adver-
tising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948) ; SIMONS, ECONOMIC
POLICY FOR A FREE SoczrY 71 (1948). But see BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF ADVERTISING 165, 168, 313 (1942). It was reported, for example, that parent
teachers associations had induced school boards to remove candy vending machines
from school houses. So successful had the campaign been that only 5% of the
schools had such machines as against 80% before the campaign started. Candy
distributors proposed a campaign to remedy the situation by advertising candy as
a food contributing to health and good spirits. Opportunities and Dangers Ahead,
10 SOUTHERN CANDY JOBBER 10, 13 (Dec. 1951). Whether advertising can
"create" demand or not, it is often credited with an ability to influence demand and
much money is spent in reliance on such beliefs. BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF ADVERTISING 337, 380 (1942); THE LAMBERT COMPANY, 1950 ANNUAL REPORT
2; Gulf Presents a New TV Show, 10 ORANGE DISC 21, 22 (Sept.-Oct. 1952).
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On the other hand, advertising and trade-marks serve as devices
to remove imperfections in that they inform buyers of the existence
of products and their prices." Classified advertising in newspapers
surely constitutes an important element looking to the reduction of
consumer ignorance. Mail order catalogs supply a host of information
concerning products, their quality and prices.' Trade-marks identify
goods by reference to standards of quality which have been tested
and approved by consumers.43 Newly developed products are quickly
brought to the attention of consumers through advertising " and
thus achieve a volume of sales which permits mass production and
hence low prices far more rapidly than would otherwise be possible. 5
41. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFITS 261 (1921) ; GORDON, ECONOMICS
FOR CONSUMERS 69, 155, 156, 165 (2d ed. 1944) ; Hotchkiss, An Economic Defense
of Advertising, 15 Am. ECON. REV. 15, 17 (Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American
Economic Association); BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 27, 169,
415 (1942); STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 72, 73
(1951) ; Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168 (1948).
How salesmen overcome inertia, as well as ignorance, is described in $1,000,000
A Year Insurance Men, 40 FORTUNE 79, 81 (July 1949) ; Sales People Arel't Selling,
40 FORTUNE 78 (Sept. 1949).
42. GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 154 (2d ed. 1944); BORDEN, THE
ECONOMC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 668 (1942). Note the important role played by
display advertisments inserted in newspapers by department stores and chain groceries.
Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3290 (1939).
43. Hotchkiss, An Economic Defense of Advertising, 15 AM. EcoN. REv. 14, 21
(Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American Economic Association); Auerbach, Quality
Standards, Informative Labeling, and Grade Labeling as Guides to Consumer Buying,
14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 362, 381 (1949) ; Wilcox, Brand Names, Quality and Price,
173 ANNALS 80, 83 (1934) ; BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 23, 25
(1942) ; Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3442 (1939). But see id. 3325; ROINSoN, THE ECONOMICS OF IM-
PERFECT COMPETITION 89 (1933); BORDEN, THE EcONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING
25 (1942). Note the following comment by a well known proponent of protection
for consumers: ". . . It isn't possible to draw sweeping conclusions that a well
known brand is necessarily the consumer's guarantee of a high-quality product.
Sometimes it is an important safeguard to assure at least reasonable quality, but it
all depends on the sense of public responsibility of the company's management, and
not at all on the volume or character of its advertising." Schlink, Off the Editor's
Chest, 30 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL. 2, 18 (Oct. 1952).
44. Hotchkiss, An Economic Defense of Advertising, 15 Am. ECON. REV. 14, 20
(Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American Economic Association); Brown, Advertising
and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1177 (1948); STOCKING AND WATKINS,
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 164 (1951); GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS
155 (2d ed. 1944); OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 230
(1951). But see the factors of jealousy and greed mentioned in Vaile, Consumption,
The End Result of Marketing, 209 ANNALS 14, 18 (1940). All that is hew does not
glitter. See, e.g., No Cure-All for Wet Basements, 30 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL.
28 (July 1952).
45. Clark, An Appraisal of Certain Criticisms of Advertising, 15 AM. ECON.
REV. 5, 7 (Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American Economic Association); BORDEN,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 173, 409, 436, 502 (1942) ; What's the Matter
with American Salesmanship?, 40 FORTUNE 67, 68 (Sept. 1949); Tosdal, The
Advertising and Selling Process, 209 ANNALS 62, 66 (1940); GORDON, ECONOMICS
FOR CONSUMERS 165 (2d ed. 1944). Query whether advertising has an effect upon
the number of producers in an industry. Clark, An Appraisal of Certain Criticisms
of Advertising, 15 Am. ECON. REV. 5, 9 (Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American
Economic Association); Hearing before Temporary National Economic Committee,
Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3298 (1939) ; Hale, Diversification Impact of Monopoly
Policy Upon Multi-Product Firms, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 320, 332 (1950).
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Without advertising many American women might still be deprived
of a Toni permanent.
4 6
Many private weapons in addition to advertising are employed
in the struggle against ignorance. Producers commonly employ "mar-
ket research" as a device to ascertain the rough outlines of consumer
demand. 7 Mass merchandisers seek constantly to inform themselves
as to product quality and market conditions." Both sellers and buyers
are aided in securing knowledge of market conditions by employment
agencies, real estate brokers, trade journals and similar services.4 9
Trade associations and professional societies engage in standardization
and testing activities. " Specialized services exist to advise domestic
consumers of the relative merits of products offered for consumption
in the home.5 Because, however, the tastes and subjective values
of consumers vary widely, the services rendered by organizations such
as Consumers' Research fall considerably short of removing all the
ignorance and irrationality with which purchasers are afflicted."
46. It is sometimes suggested that advertising might be able to smooth out
hourly, daily, seasonal or longer fluctuations in business volume. Advertising, for
example, might induce housewives to buy their groceries earlier in the week when
stores are not operating at capacity levels. Shifts in Advertising Sought for Weekly
"Second Food Day," 20 THE AMERICAN BAKER 50 (Jan. 1952). See What's the
Matter with Amterican Stalesmanship?, 40 FORTUNE 67, 69 (Sept. 1949). Query
whether such an effect should be deemed the removal of an imperfection or an effort
to alter demand.
47. Jeuck, Marketing Research-Milestone or Millstone?, 17 J. MARKETING 381
(1953); BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 127 (1942).
48. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 316 (1951);
White, Marketing Research, 209 ANNALS 183, 185 (1940) ; KADANOVSKY, CONSUMER
STANDARDS 306, 311 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). But see id. at 323. Even rela-
tively small retailers sometimes approach market studies. A highly amusing account
of the efforts of a dealer in infants' wear to secure the names of potential customers
before its competitors will be found in Watson, "Crib of the Month" Club Plan Rocks
Miami, 6 JUVENILE MERCHANDISING 60 (Jan. 1952).
49. LYON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC Lim 216 n. (1939); Our Market
Opinion, THE CHEESE REPORTER 5 (Jan. 18, 1952); Lampson, Fraser & Huth,
Inc., March Sapphire Sale, 18 FtU. J. 9 (March-April 1952); LOESER, THE OVER-
THE-CouNTER SECURITIES MARKET CC. I-IV (1940); Wexman, Financial Advice and
Guidance for Sinall Business, 11 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoD. 334, 338 (1945) ; KAPLAN,
SMALL BUSINESS: ITS PLACE AND PROBLEMS 119 (1948). Even managers of steel
mills find it advantageous to utilize the services of brokers in buying scrap iron.
The Scrap Men, 39 FORTUNE 86, 88 (Jan. 1949).
50. GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 517, 519 (2d ed. 1944); KAImANOVSKY,
CONSUMER STANDARDS 211 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). But see Hearings before
Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3380 (1939)
(complaint that "Good Houskeeping" seal of approval granted too liberally).
51. KAIDANOVsrY, CONSUMER STANDARDS 312 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941);
SORENSON, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 33 (1941). An example of significant service
rendered by such organizations in bringing new products to the attention of con-
sumers is found in Plastic Dishes, 30 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL. 10 (July 1952).
Some observers have held high hopes for consumer advisory services, e.g., SIMONS,
ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FRE SOCIETY 73, 85 (1948) ; STEWART AND DEWHURST, DOES
DISTRmUTION COST Too MUCH? 350, 352 (1939) ; Oxenfeldt, Consumer Knowledge:
Its Measurement and Extent, 32 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 300, 306, 312, 313 (1950).
52. Mitchell, THE BACKWARD ART OF SPENDING MONEY in AMERICAN STANDARDS
AND PLANES OF LIVING 377, 384 (Eliot ed. 1931) ; Montgomery, Consumer Standards
and Marketing, 209 ANNALS 141, 142 (1950); LYON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND
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Hence private efforts have not been wholly successful in overcoming
such frictions.'
STATUTORY EFFORTS TO REDUCE IMPERFECTIONS
Much governmental activity has been directed at the reduction
of frictions in the market place. 4 Establishment of uniform weights
and measures by statute has contributed immensely to the smooth
flow of commerceY Many agencies and particularly those of the
federal government, such as the Departments of Agriculture and
Commerce, are constantly engaged in the collection and dissemination
of information concerning crops, minerals, finished products and their
prices.5" The whole census of manufactures can be regarded as an
effort to improve our knowledge of industry and hence to reduce
imperfections arising out of ignorance. In the labor field, establish-
ment of an employment service on a national basis at public expense
EcONOMIC LIFE 235 (1939); BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 646
(1942); Beem, Consumer-Financed Testing and Rating Agencies, 16 J. MARKETING
272, 274, 278 (1952). In part the difficulty arises from an attempt to determine which
commodity is "best" for everyone and hence, in some degree, to limit consumer
sovereignty. But see Clark, An Appraisal of Certain Criticisins of Advertising, 15
Am. ECON. REV. 5, 11 (Supp. 1925) (Proceedings American Economic Association) ;
DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 1 (1949).
Attempts to avoid the standardization inherent in an effort to specify which com-
modity is "best" encounter the obstacle of consumer failure to understand the tech-
nical problems involved. Beem, CONSUMER-FINANCED TESTING AND RATING
AGENCIES, 16 J. MARKETING 272, 280 (1952); KADANOVSxY, CONSUMER STANDARDS
351 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). Take, for example, Administrator, Production
and Marketing Division, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Standards, Fruit
Preserves, 17 FED. REG. 11,683 (1952). In section 52.30.333(f) (4) of that Regula-
tion, the Administrator was attempting to specify grades of jams. His method was
to weigh various factors. The "flavour" was given a weight of 40%. In the dis-
cussion of flavour, however, all the Administrator could say was that it should be
"good" and "characteristic" of the kind of fruit involved.
53. It has sometimes been urged that consumers be organized for political pur-
poses into "pressure groups." GORDON, EcoNoMICs FOR CONSUMERS 291, 397, 518,
592 (2d ed. 1944). On the other hand, it appears that agencies purportedly repre-
senting the interest of consumers have sometimes held other objectives. Such
political objectives have probably hindered the agencies in the accomplishment
of their ostensible purposes. SORENSON, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 127, 226 (1941) ;
Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3381 et seq. (1939).
54. Interventionist measures adopted by government should, of course, be dis-
tinguished from activity designed to reduce imperfections. Some legislation may
fall on the border line. Take, for example, the prescription of minimum wages and
the prohibition of usury. 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1946), as amended,
63 STAT. 912 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. 1952); Illinois Act to revise the law
in relation to the rate of interest, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 74, § 1 (1947). If free market
prices are above the minima prescribed by the wage legislation or below the rates
fixed by the usury statutes, then governmental action merely removes imperfections
in that it protects ignorant workers and borrowers who are unfamiliar with market
values.
55. LYON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 217 (1939); KAIDANOVSKY,
CONSUMER STANDARDS 20 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). Similarly, our whole sys-
tem of commercial law has a like purpose.
56. LYON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 240, 243, 245 (1939);
GORDON, EcoNoMIcs FOR CONSUMERS 570 (2d ed. 1944).
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reflects a congressional desire to assist both employers and employees
through the rapid dissemination of information concerning the avail-
ability of jobs and workers."
Misrepresentations, of course, are a prime source of ignorance
in the market place. Although the rule of caveat emptor may still
hold some sway, the common law always protected buyers against active
deceit."8 In recent years statutory regulation, both state and federal,
has gone far to protect buyers against positive misstatements.
Measures to protect the public against adulterated and mis-branded
foods have long enjoyed popularity and recent amendments have
made those measures more effective. 9  Regulation has not been
limited, however, to situations in which public health and safety are
affected. Several federal statutes require affirmative labeling of goods
in the market place. The names which can be applied to furs, for
example, are now controlled under statutory authority."0 In the sale
of securities governmental requirements are particularly strict and
detailed. "Blue Sky" legislation compels sellers of stocks and bonds
to make full disclosure of all pertinent facts to their customers. 6'
It has often been urged that governmental action should go far
beyond mere prohibitions of misrepresentation. As indicated above,
57. 48 STAT. 114, 29 U.S.C. §49(b) (1946) (Federal Employment Service).
But see SIMONS, EcoNoMIc POLICY FOR A F=EE SocraTY 61 (1948); LYON, et al.,
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 241 (1939). Particular attention has been de-
voted to supplying information to small business. H.R. REP. No. 2,513, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 31 (1952) (Select Committee on Small Business, Final Report); 56 STAT.
351 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 1101 (1946) (Small Business Mobilization). But see 53
STAT. 1435 (1939), 44 U.S.C. §301 et seq. (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 381
(1949), 44 U.S.C.A. §§301 et seq. (Supp. 1952); 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE
COMMEaRCE COMMISSION 22, 284 (1931) (requirement that railroad tariffs be pub-
lished).
58. Kittelle and Campbell, Power of the Federal Trade Commission to Require
Informative Labeling of Textiles, 20 B.U.L. Rxv. 23, 29 (1940); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 525 (1938).
59. 34 STAT. 1260 (1907), 21 U.S.C. § 71 (1946) (Meat Inspection); 61 STAT.
163 (1947), 7 U.S.C. § 135 (Supp. 1952) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act); 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1946)_ (Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); Handler, The Control of False Advertising under
the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 91 (1939); Legis., The Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1938, 39 COL. L. REv. 259, 263 (1939); Lindhahl, The
Federal Trade Comninission Act as Amended in 1938, 47 J. PoL. EcoN. 497 (1939).
But see Schlink, What Government Does and Might Do for the Consumer, 173
ANNALS 125, 127, 135, 137 (1934).
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 69 (Supp. 1952) (Fur Products Labeling Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 68 (1946) (Wool Products Labeling Act); 49 STAT. 977 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 201
(1946) (Federal Alcohol Administration Act); KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS
94, 96, 158, 235 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). Activities of the National Bureau
of Standards in co-operation with trade associations to encourage use of more in-
formative labeling are described in Briggs, Services of the National Bureau of
Standards to Consumers, 173 ANNALS 153, 156 (1934).
61. Note also the legislation compelling disclosure in the solicitation of proxies
and the like. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1946) (Securities Exchange Act) ; Loss, SEctrrIEs
REGULATION 492, 523 (1951). Similarly, attempts have been made to compel issuers
of securities to sell them on a basis of competitive bidding. Id. at 264.
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the standardization of commodities is necessary for them to achieve that
homogeneous character requisite for both pure and perfect competition.
Buyers cannot act rationally if they do not identify goods by precise
quality standards. Hence it has been urged that statutes should
authorize the standardization and "grade labelling" of all commodities. 2
Standardization and grading activities, however, are subject to several
objections. Complicated machines, for example, reflect a series of
compromises among various engineering aims and it would be difficult
to grade them in terms which would be significant and meaningful
to all buyers.' Similarly, standardization could be carried so far
as unduly to limit consumer choice and hence to defeat the very
consumer sovereignty which a free market economy seeks to achieve. 4
Again, standardization and grading activities might be subject to
political pressures of a monopolistic character and hence-if not for
other reasons-tend to curb innovation and stultify the economy.'
We find, however, a number of statutes which do require governmental
action looking to the standardization and grading of commodities.
Most of them fall in the field of agriculture and were designed prim-
arily for the promotion of producers' interests. 6  The present Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 7 however, has a broader purpose and it
has been applied so as to prohibit the production and sale of whole-
62. SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (1941); HoYT, CoNSUMPTION
IN OUR SocIr 110 (1938); Agnew, The Movement for Standards for Consumer
Goods, 173 ANNALS 60 (1934) ; Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling,
and Grade Labeling as Guides to Consumer Buying, 14 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 362,
366 (1949). Earlier literature is summarized in KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER
STANDARDS 355, 361 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941).
63. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 509, 510 (1951);
WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISE 132 (National Industrial Conference Board, 3d ed. 1940).
64. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 508 (1951);
WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
124 (National Industrial Conference Board, 3d ed. 1940). But see Mack, Clothing
and Household Goods for Consumers, 173 ANNALS 35, 42 (1934); LYON, et al.,
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 236 (1939).
65. Note, for example, the authoritarian over-tone in SORENSON, THE CONSUMER
MOVEMENT 24 (1941). Congressional reaction to OPA efforts looking to the
standardization of commodities is illustrative of such fears. Auerbach, Quality
Standards, Informative Labeling, and Grade Labeling as Guides to Consumer Buying,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 362, 374 (1949).
66. See, e.g., INT. Rxv. CODF. § 1922 et seq.; 42 STAT. 1517 (1923), 7 U.S.C. §§ 52,
56 and 57 (1946) (United States Cotton Standards Act); 37 STAT. 250 (1912), 21
U.S.C. § 20 (1946) (an act to establish a standard barrel and a standard grade for
apples); 42 STAT. 1435 (1923), 7 U.S.C. § 93 (1946) (Naval Stores Act) ; 39 STAT.
482, 483 (1916), 7 U.S.C. §§ 74, 76 (1946) (United States Grain Standards Act);
LYON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 227, 230 (1939). An example of a
recently promulgated standard will be found in Administrator, Production and
Marketing Division, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, U.S. Standards, Cauliflower, 17
FED. REG. 11,137 (1952). A detailed account of federal activity in the field of
standardization will be found in KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS 14, 23, 77, 93,
97, 111, 197 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941).
67. 52 STAT. 1040 et seq. (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 401, 403(h) (1) (1946)
(Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
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some and honestly labeled food. Such utilization of the statute was
approved by the Supreme Court on the express ground that the intent
of the Congress was to protect consumers against a confusing variety
of products through exercise of a standardization power. In the case
referred to, The Quaker Oats Company was prevented from marketing
a type of farina enriched with certain vitamins. The Quaker product
was unacceptable because it was neither plain farina nor enriched with
all the vitamins prescribed in the governmental standard for "enriched
farina." 68 Whether such stautory restrictions are desirable may be
open to debate. Their existence, however, indicates a Congressional
intent to reduce the imperfection of ignorance through administrative
standardization.
EFFECTS UPON INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-TRUST STATUTES
Anti-trust decisions have always taken account of market im-
perfections.69 There has, however, been little if any explicit discussion
of such frictions in anti-trust opinions. It is thus possible that the
role of imperfections has not received due recognition: judicial
zeal to extirpate "impurities" may have been so powerful as to blind
the courts to the desirability of curbing market frictions. No doubt
such frictions are present in every situation from which an anti-trust
case arises. In subsequent paragraphs we shall only consider decisions
in which the role of imperfections has been most obvious.
71
Trade Commission Activities against Fraud.:-There has been
much dissatisfaction with the performance of the Federal Trade
Commission.71  As many observers have noted, the commission
was expected to take vigorous action against monopoly but has
devoted most of its attention to the suppression of misrepre-
sentations in trade. That shift in emphasis has been the subject of
many biting comments. Mr. Henderson rebuked the commission
68. Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 226, 230,
231 (1943).
69. But see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised
National Antitrust Policy 50 Micr. L. REv. 1139, 1151, 1154 (1952).
70. Many other examples could be cited in which imperfections have played a
role, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 336
(D. Mass. 1953); RESTAToxNT, CoNTRAcrs § 516(a) (1932). Indeed, the whole
problem of entry into competition may be profoundly affected by the imperfections
of inertia and ignorance. See Wright, Some Pitfalls of Economic Theory as a
Guide to the Law of Competition, 37 VA. L. REv. 1083 (1951).
71. The organic statute is the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41
(1946). Section 45(a), as amended, provides: ". . . Unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared
unlawful.'
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for wasting time "upon petty squabbles and dishonesties." 72 Even so
sophisticated a jurist as Mr. Justice Brandeis did not believe that the
Federal Trade Commission Act was designed directly to protect con-
sumers.7" A statutory amendment in 1938 ' was required before the
courts recognized that misrepresentations may be harmful even though
no competitor is directly affected.7 5 Sophisticated sneers greeted the
opinion in the Standard Education Society case,7" in which one court
finally permitted the commission to pursue a stringent anti-fraud policy.
Most lawyers preferred the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in the
court below and agreed that the commission's "trivial niceties" were
"too impalpable for practical affairs." 77
It may be conceded that the commission could easilr push its
powers too far. Elimination of all puffing and a requirement of
absolute truth in advertising could result in a bureaucratic paternalism
of dangerous proportions.78  Any such program would probably exceed
the needs of the market place. If consumer ignorance, however, con-
72. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION 339 (1925). See Watldns,
An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Commission, 32 COL. L. REV. 272,
277 (1932) ; WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE 125 (National Industrial Conference Board, 3d ed. 1940); COMMITTEE
ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ComISSIONS, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON OR-
GANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 119, 120 (1949);
STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 548 n.7 (1951);
H.R. REP. No. 2513, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 278 (1952).
73. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27, 28 (1929). Cf. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421, 427 (1920) ; American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281, 284,
285 (6th Cir. 1900); Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC, 113 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir.
1940). See Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission over False
Advertising, 31 COL. L. REV. 527, 529, 533 (1931); Handler, Unfair Competition
and the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399, 401 (1940).
74. The 1938 amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act.
75. Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 643 (3d Cir. 1941); Pep Boys v.
FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 160 (3d Cir. 1941). Compare FTC v. Standard Education
Society, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937). See Handler, The Control of False Advertising
under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 91, 96 (1939); Handler,
Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
399, 404 (1940) ; Kittelle and Campbell, Power of the Federal Trade Commission to
Require Informative Labeling of Textiles, 20 B.U.L. REv. 23, 27 (1940); Legis.,
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938, 39 COL. L. REv. 259, 261, 262 (1939).
76. FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). Cf. (earlier
cases) FTC v. R. F. Keppel and Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934). Accord (later cases), Book-of-the-Month
Club, Inc. v. FTC, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953); Rothschild v. FTC, 200 F.2d 39
(7th Cir. 1952) ; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1951) ;
P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950); Carlay Co. v. FTC, 153
F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1946) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1945) ;
Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944);
Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942); Ford Motor Co. v.
FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941).
77. FTC v. Standard Education Society, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936). See
Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC, 113 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1940). See also
WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
152 (National Industrial Conference Board, 3d ed. 1940).
78. WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE 141, 146 (National Industrial Conference Board, 3d ed. 1940). See
BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 760, 774 (1942); GORDON,
ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 198 (2d ed. 1944).
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tributes as greatly to market imperfections as this study indicates,
the position of the Federal Trade Commission may be more rational
than heretofore supposed. Common law remedies are often inade-
quate " and, without expressing a view as to any particular decision,
we may well find ourselves sympathetic to the position taken by the
commission." Similarly, there may be more justification than has
heretofore been recognized for the affirmative labeling requirements
contained in various trade practice conference rules of the commission.
Those advisory interpretations of the commission's organic act have
often been regarded as ultra vires to the extent that they imposed an
affirmative duty upon sellers of labeling goods."I For reasons ex-
pressed above, we may well hesitate to endow the commission with
broad powers to standardize goods.8 2 To the extent that such regula-
tion removes market imperfections, however, it may contribute to
an economic allocation of resources. 8
79. Watkins, An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Commission, 32
COL. L. REv. 272, 276 (1932); LYON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND ECONOmiC LIFE 318
(1939).
80. Profesor Handler is one of the few experts in' the field who has vigorously
approved the commission's activities in the area of misrepresentation. Handler, The
Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB.
91, 98 (1939); Handler, Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission, 8
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 399, 405, 406, 418, 420 (1940). To the same general effect see
STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 351 (1951); KNIGHT,
RISE, UNCERTAINTY AND PaoFiTs 78 (1921); MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 115
(1941). It should be recorded, however, that few voices were raised in support of
the commission's position at the University of Chicago's anti-trust seminar on
June 17, 1953.
81. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., FTC, SEN. Doc. No. 186, PART 6, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 31 (1940); Hale, Agreements Among Competitors, 33 MINN. L. REv. 331,
335 (1949); Note, Federal Trade Commission Cosmetic Trade Practice Rules, 65
HARv. L. REv. 1261, 1262 (1952); 16 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 204.2, 204.5 (Cum. Supp.
1952) (Federal Trade Commission, Rayon and Acetate Textile Industry). See also
Kittelle and Campbell, Power of the Federal Trade Commission to Require Informa-
tive Labeling of Textiles, 20 B.U.L. Rm. 23, 26, 34, 36 (1940) ; Kittelle and Mostow,
A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Commission, 9
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 427, 439, 446 (1940).
82. See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
818 (1950); Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941). But cf.
Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941). Instances may arise
in which the expense of precise labeling is more costly than the imperfections which
would thereby be removed, e.g., Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir.
1941) ; KAiDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS 350 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). It
is also not impossible that regulation of the type in question could take on an inter-
ventionist character. Thus the following statement was found in a trade journal:
"After considerable discussion it was the general opinion that the Fur Products
Labeling Act held great promise of eliminating a substantial part of the unfavorable
competition from low grade pelts and means were agreed upon to advance this
project as fast as expedient." National Board of Fur Farm Organizations, Report
of Meeting of Executive Committee, 19 FuR J. 11 (Sept.-Oct. 1952). See Hamilton,
The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1138, 1148, 1152 (1931)
MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 113 (1941).
83. Lotteries have been forbidden as a means of selling goods. FTC v. R. F.
Keppel and Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Deer v. FTC, 152 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.
1945) ; Handler, Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 399, 415 (1940). Elimination of the lottery feature in a sale consti-
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Horizontal Size:-We experience great difficulty in defining a
monopoly. It is hard to say how small firms must be in order to
avoid "impurities." 11 In that effort, however, account should be
taken of the often repeated view that small firms are more likely
to deceive their customers than large enterprises. 5 No positive proof
of that tendency has been found, nor can any specific size be named
as indicative of questionable representations. It is true, however,
that the extensive services offered by large concerns to teach consumers
how to use their products and the like, could scarcely be offered by
their smaller competitors.86 Mass merchandisers can inspect the goods
tutes standardization and to that extent appears to be meritorious. The commission's
activities in the field of commercial bribery and false disparagement of competitors
can likewise be supported as tending to remove market imperfections. Id. at 408;
Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941); Nims, Unfair Competi-
tion by False Statements or Disparagement, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 63 (1933) ; OXENFELDr,
INDUsTRIAL. PRICING AND MAxr PRACTICES 254 (1951). But see HENDERSON,
THE FEDERAL TADE COMMISSION 216 (1924). Query, however, whether the com-
mission should be empowered to prevent firms from advertising, or to control the
manner in which business is solicited. Cf. New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. FTC, 264
Fed. 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1920). See HENDERSON, THE FEDEA.L TRADE CoMMIssIoN
224 (1924).
84. Hale, Size and Shape, 1950 U. OF ILL. L. FoRum 515, 525.
85. OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACrICES 255 (1951);
STOCEING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 317 (1951); Hearings
before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, Committee on the Judiciary,
Serial 12, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 493 (1952); Hearings before Temporary National
Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3336 (1939); Loss, SEcURITES
REGULATION 380 (1951).
Many judicial findings could be cited to the same effect. Thus, in Radio Shack
Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 180 F.2d 200, 202 (7th Cir. 1950) it was said: "Some 22
years after plaintiff herein was organized, and long after the plaintiff had widely
used its corporate name as its trade name, defendants deliberately went into direct
competition, using for all practical purposes the identical corporate and trade name.
For some four years prior to incorporation of the defendant company at least one
of its officers had knowledge of the plaintiff and of the operation of its business."
As to the importance of integrity upon the part of producers and distributors
see BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 678 (1942).
Considerable thought has been given to the possibility of a survey which would
test the suggestion made in the text that small firms are more likely to deceive their
customers than large ones. It was proposed, for example, to select five scattered
volumes of Federal Trade Commission decisions and to determine whether more
cease and desist orders had been entered against small producers and distributors
than against their larger competitors. Aside from the merely mechanical difficulties
of ascertaining the size of the various firms against which the commission has
entered orders over the years, several insuperable obstacles have prevented the mak-
ing of such a survey. One obvious difficulty is that the Federal Trade Commission's
jurisdiction extends only to interstate commerce. In earlier years particularly, that
restriction upon its activities might result in the elimination of many smaller firms
from its purview. A second obstacle lies in the fact that there are degrees of mis-
representation. If it appeared that small firms engage in flagrant frauds while
their larger competitors merely fail to make information in their hands available
to their customers, the action taken by the commission in such cases would scarcely
be comparable in character. For these reasons it is not now known how the com-
parative integrity of small business can be tested. It is probable that imperfections
play a considerably more important role in the determination of appropriate size
than indicated in this study. It is hoped that the topic may be expanded in future
research.
86. GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 508 (2d ed. 1944). In many instances,
large firms insist that their salesmen enjoy considerable technical ability, e.g.,
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they offer for sale to the ignorant consumer with much greater care
and expert knowledge than small independent merchants. Indeed, some
of the largest distributing concerns maintain their own laboratories for
the benefit both of consumers and producers. 7 It follows that the
confidence which consumers have placed in such large scale dis-
tributors, evidenced by acceptance of their private brands (often
available at prices below those established for heavily advertised
brands of the same commodities), may not be misplaced."8
Recognition of market imperfections will not, in all likelihood,
lead to any alteration in our notions as to an acceptable size for
manufacturing concerns. As just indicated, however, mass mer-
chandisers render services to consumers of a type which little merchants
cannot match. Display advertising of chain and department stores in
MINNEAPOLIS-HONEYWELL REGULATOR CO., 1950 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1951); PARKE,
DAviS & Co., 84TH ANNUAL REPoRT 10 (1951). A flour miller conducts a cooking
school with a tremendous registration, develops and promulgates new recipes, and
broadcasts the information over a radio network of 187 stations. GENERAL MILLS,
INC., 20TH ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1948). A public utility concern conducted a cooking
school with over 9,000 home demonstrations given during a single year. Its elec-
tricians worked with architects and contractors to make recommendations for the
wiring of residential and commercial buildings. OHIO EDISON Co., 1950 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 7 (1951). Metropolitan Life Insurance Company engages in activities designed to
promote public health, and also conducts a nursing service for some of its policy
holders. Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 12, 76th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5838, 5840 (1939). A firm which the Attorney General seeks to
break into five separate competing companies produced six motion pictures in 1950
showing customers how to carve meat and how to cook foods. ARMOUR & Co., 1950
ANNUAL REPORT 3, 5 (1951). A company engaged in the lending of money has
published a number of helpful pamphlets telling its patrons how to buy intelligently.
The pamphlets appear to be reliable and to give sound, non-political advice which
should be of considerable assistance to consumers. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORA-
TION, BETTER BUYMANSHIP: MEAT, FISH, POULTRY AND EGGS (1951); HOUSEHOLD
FINANCE CORPORATION, MONEY MANAGEMENT: YOUR HOME FURNISHINGS DoLLA
(1952). Note also, the activities of large firms as buyers. They conduct extensive
investigations, standardize the commodities they require, and probably thus contribute
in an important manner to the reduction of market imperfections at that level.
KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS 191, 192 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941). Such
benefits may reflect the balancing of monopoly with monopsony which has, of course,
effects in the realm of "impurities." It has been suggested that large firms are
more likely to indulge in undesirable types of advertising than small ones. See
STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 73 (1951). If that
assertion can be proven, it may relate only to very large firms and not to those of
middle size. Another factor worthy of mention is that firms may be too small to
comply with regulations designed to remove market imperfections. Take, for ex-
ample, the case of a firm desiring to raise a small amount of capital by public sale
of its securities. See note 61 supra.
87. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 316 (1951);
GORDON, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 511 (2d ed. 1944); SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co.,
1952 ANNUAL REPORT 15-9 (1953). The catalog published by the rival mail order
firm of Montgomery Ward & Company is famous for its detailed information on
various products such as radios, hot water tanks and the like.
88. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 368 (1941); SORENSON, THE CON-
SUMER MOVEMENT 11 (1941); BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 42,
605 (1942). It does not follow, of course, that the private brand of merchandise
is always of the highest available quality. 1953 TV Receivers, 30 CONSUMERS' RE-
SEARCH BULL. 5, 8 (Dec. 1952). As to the value of endorsements by publishers of
magazines and the like, some information will be found in Hearst Magazines, Inc.,
32 F.T.C. 1440 (1941).
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metropolitan newspapers is often highly informative. 9  It is clear,
also, that some degree of size is necessary to permit sellers to engage
in those market research activities which we have noted as important
in the reduction of ignorance of demand." Thus it is possible that
a desire to reduce market imperfections could affect the problem of
horizontal size in the field of distribution.
Trade-Mark "'Monopolies":-In recent years the view has often
been expressed that trade-marks are monopolistic in character. Judge
Jerome Frank, perhaps the most active proponent of that point of
view, has stated that legal protection of trade names does not engender
competition but, on the contrary, creates lawful monopoliesf 1 A pro-
ducer seeking to enjoin use of his trade-mark on goods sold to the
same type of consumers through identical channels of distribution
was rebuked by the court of appeals for the seventh circuit, which
referred to "[t] he unconscionable efforts of the plaintiffs to monopolize
the food market by their monopoly of the word Sunkist." 92 A more
sophisticated view finds trade-marks objectionable in that they permit
that product differentiation utilized by oligopolists to avoid the impact
of pure competition.' Upon whatever ground, some of the literature
can be read as an argument in favor of the abolition of trade-marks
and similar identifying mechanisms.
94
89. Note also that mass merchandisers may be able to reduce advertising costs.
BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 465, 470, 483 (1942). Compare
NELSON AND KEim, PRIcE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 88 (TNEC Mono-
graph 1, 1941).
90. White, Marketing Research, 209 ANNALS 183, 184 (1940).
91. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957, 958,
959 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) ; Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler,
151 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion). See STOCKING AND WATKINS,
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 509 (1951); Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the
Monopoly Phobia, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 967, 968, n.3, 974, 976 (1952).
92. California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F2d 971, 975
(7th Cir. 1947).
93. Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 323, 325 (1949). Cf. Consolidated Book Publishers, Inc. v. FTC,
53 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553 (1932).
94. See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1190
(1948) ; Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 323, 326 (1949) ; MILLER, UNFAIR ComPETrro 116 (1941).
As Mr. Timberg points out trade-marks can be used as vehicles for both horizontal
and vertical price fixing schemes. Timberg supra, at 328, 352. It is also true, as
indicated in the text, that if a commodity becomes known only by its brand name the
producer using that mark will gain a monopoly advantage. Id. at 324; Montgomery,
Consumer Standards and Marketing, 209 ANNALS 141, 144 (1950) ; Stocking, Modern
Advertising and Economic Theory, 21 Am. EcoN. REv. 43, 52 and n.17 (1931). At
that point, however, the mark has ceased to distinguish the brand of the commodity
in question from other brands of the same commodity. It becomes descriptive in
character and hence is denied protection. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 735 (1938) ; CAL1L-
MANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 74.1 (1st ed. 1945) ;
Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual
Property, 40 T.M. REP. 613, 625, 626 (1950). But see Timberg supra, at 332 (ex-
pensive to litigate issue of loss of distinctiveness).
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Supporters of trade-marks point out the difference between a
patent or a copyright and a mere trade-mark." Resources of the
language, they argue, are inexhaustible and the existence of 6,000
brands of shoes and 10,000 brands of wheat flour is cited as evidence
of that fact." Trade-marks, they urge, are mere means of identifica-
tion and do not in themselves confer any monopoly in the commodities
to which they are attached. 7  In some degree, at least, trade-marks
constitute a certificate of quality 98 and the fact that the Federal Trade
Commission has moved against those using the trade-marks of others
indicates that infringement of a mark constitutes a positive misrepre-
sentation. 9  In short, if the courts refused to enjoin the use of trade-
marks by those not entitled to them under the established law of
unfair competition, their decisions would tend to promote rather than
suppress market imperfections.
The conflict between those who would curb impurities and those
who would suppress imperfections through restricting or encouraging
the use of trade-marks comes to a focus in cases wherein it must be
decided how far trade-mark protection shall be extended. The most
ardent "restrictionist" (with the exception of those who would abolish
trade-marks altogether) would not permit a second user of the mark
to apply it to identical goods. He would, however, deny the trade-
mark owner injunctive relief in cases wherein the infringer is not
95. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. Rxv. 967,
971 (1952); Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property, 40 T.M. REP. 613, 614 (1950); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REv.
1139, 1217 (1952).
96. Wilcox, Brand Names, Quality and Price, 173 ANNALS 80, 82 (1934);
BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 633 (1942); see Best & Co. v.
Miller, 167 F.2d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1948) (Judge Clark's dissenting opinion).
97. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 176-7 (1949). Cf. Mishawaka Rubber Co. v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). Query whether trademarks could survive govern-
mental grade-labeling. See Agnew, The Movement for Standards for Consumer
Goods, 173 ANNALS 60, 66 (1934).
98. BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADvERTISING 23, 629, 631-2 (1942). Note
the following statement: "CR Bulletins have often mentioned the desirability of
knowing by what manufacturer an article has been produced, and the need, as a
practical matter, and for very good reasons, of avoiding the purchase of any im-
portant food, beverage, or other article or appliance of unknown origin." Clinical
Thermometers, 31 CONSUMERS' RESEARCH BULL. 24 (Jan. 1953). But see GORDON,
EcoNOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 247 (2d ed. 1944).
99. Juvenile Shoe Co. v. FTC, 289 Fed. 57 (9th Cir. 1923); Pep Boys v. FTC,
122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941); FTC v. Real Products Corp., 90 F.2d 617 (2d Cir.
1937); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 169, 170 (1924); WATKINS,
PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 184 (Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board, 3d ed. 1940)'; CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION App. E (5th ed. 1946). But cf. FTC v. Klesner, 280
U.S. 19 (1929). See also Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion over False Advertising, 31 COL. L. REv. 527, 538 (1931). In the Lanham Act
it was specifically provided that a false designation of origin should be considered
a tort. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
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a competitor. Apparently that view is based on the belief that such
protection of the trade-mark against "dilution" encourages a persua-
sive rather than an informative use of advertising. Informative ad-
vertising is recognized as desirable in that it reduces consumer
ignorance. Mere persuasive advertising is, however, identified with
product differentiation and hence with monopoly.'
Historically, the basic principle of the law of unfair competition
has been protection of the consumer from confusion.' That view
is, of course, closely related to the suppression of market imperfections.
Undoubtedly, a narrow scope of legal protection would weaken the
persuasive force of trade-marks. Tiffany, the jeweler, would not
have sought an injunction against the use of his name in the produc-
tion of motion pictures 102 had he not believed that such use would
detract from his good will; 103 and if advertising which is merely
persuasive in character is a principal weapon of the oligopolist, then
refusal to issue the injunction against a non-competitor may contribute
in some degree to the enforcement of our anti-trust policy. On the
other hand, if likelihood of confusion ... can be proven even in a minor
degree, the court denying injunctive relief may be striking a feeble
blow against market impurities while adding in considerable measure
to market imperfections.
Cooperation Among Competitors:-Trade associations often pro-
mulgate codes of ethics and take similar action against misrepresenta-
tion and other forms of activity regarded as unfair competition.
100. Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly and the Restraint of Competition, 14
LAW & CONTEmp. PROB. 323, 351 (1949) ; Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest,
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1184, 1194 (1948). The proprietor of a trade-mark which has
achieved public acceptance may well wish to use it in the promotion of other or
new goods. See, e.g., SUNBEAM CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1953); BORDEN Co.,
1950 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1950). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 731 (1938). Hence
the problem may become one of diversification. See Hale, Diversification: Impact of
Monopoly Policy upon Multi-Product Firms, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 320, 340 (1950).
101. Oates, Relief in Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-Competitors,
25 ILL. L. Rv. 643, 655 (1931). See CALLmANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION AND TRADE MAKS § 3.4 (1st ed. 1945).
102. See Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1932),
aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. Supp. 821 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188
N.E. 30 (1933); Callmann, Trade-Mark Infringement and Unfair Competition, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185, 189 (1949).
103. Development of the view that a trade-mark is property and should be pro-
tected even on non-competing goods can be traced in Schechter, Fog and Fiction
in Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COL. L. REv. 60, 84 (1936) ; Oates, Relief in Equity
Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-Competitors, 25 ILL. L. REv. 643, 650
(1931) ; Lunsford, Trade-Mark Infingement and Confusion of Source: Need for Su-
preme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REV. 214, 217 (1949); Note, Trade-Marks, Unfair
Competition and the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of the Lanham Act, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1094 (1953).
104. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 730; Note, Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition and
the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of the Lanham Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1094,
1096 (1953). But cf. MILLER, UNFAIR ComPEIoN 116 (1941).
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Support of "better business bureaus" and of the Federal Trade Com-
mission's trade practice conferences constitute conspicuous examples
of such trade association practices. 105 Whether such groups should
be permitted to curb style piracy, protect the public against indecency
and prohibit the practice of medicine by corporations 106 is, of course,
debatable. To the extent, however, that such activity reduces fraud
and unethical practices in the market place, it should at least receive
the sympathetic consideration of the courts.
0 7
Trade associations also engage in market research activities "I
and particularly in the gathering and dissemination of trade sta-
tistics.'0 9 Over the years the permissible boundaries of such trade
association activity have been delineated with reasonable clarity." 0
The courts liave, for example, insisted that the information circulated
should be made available to purchasers and the public at large as well
as to producers."' Such restrictions are highly desirable because
publication of trade statistics has often formed a convenient vehicle
for price fixing conspiracies." Those who take the extreme position
105. HENDERSON, TE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMissioN 181 (1924); PEARCE, TRADE
AssoCIATIoN SURVEY 345 (TNEC Monograph 18, 1941); LYON, THE A.B.C. OF THE
N.R.A. 175-180 (1934); Hale, Agreements Among Competitors, 33 MINN. L. Rv.
331, 349 (1949) ; SORENSON, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 11, 198-9 (1941) ; GORDON,
ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 516, 517 (2d ed. 1944); Hearings before Temporary
National Economic Committee, Part 10, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4634 (1939) ; 16 CODE
FED. REGS. § 135.1(c) (2d ed. 1949) (silk industry rule).
106. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); American
Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) ; Hale, Agreements Among
Competitors, 33 MINN. L. REv. 331, 352, 375, 377, 379. (1949); Comment, 40 COL.
L. REV. 736, 739 (1940).
107. A leading authority said some years ago: "Regulation of unfair and de-
ceptive competitive practices, the arbitration of commercial disputes, the standardiza-
tion of identity and quality of products, the improvement of conditions of labor, the
registration of trade-marks and original styles and designs, the conservation of
natural resources, the elimination of wasteful practices, and the promotion of
efficiencies in production and distribution are only a few of the fields in which trade
associations perform a distinct social service." HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CON-
STRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 28 (TNEC Mono-
graph 38, 1941).
108. White, Marketing Research, 209 ANNALS 183, 186 (1940); GORDON, Eco-
NOMIcS FOR CONSUMERS 508 (2d ed. 1944); KAPLAN, SMIALL BUSINESS: ITS PLACE
AND PROBLEMS 124-5, 132 (1948).
109. PEARCE, TRADE ASSOCIATION SURVEY C. 5 (TNEC Monograph 18, 1941);
MILLER, UNFAIR ComprITION 285 (1941).
110. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 18 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941) ; Comment, 18 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 380 (1951).
111. See Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 462 (1st Cir. 1949).
But cf. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 604 (1936) ; HANDLER,
A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAws 21 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
112. American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921);
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 26 (1949); Comment, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REV.
380, 381 (1951).
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of advocating abolition of such activities," 3 however, apparently over-
look the contribution they make to the reduction of imperfections.
Mr. Justice Brandeis argued that the Sherman Act did not require
competition to be pursued blindly and Mr. Justice Holmes suggested
that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent interchange made with
full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the future." 4
It is true that governmental agencies do provide much the same service
in the agricultural field which presumably, could be extended to those
areas now served by trade associations." 5 Any extension of such
governmental activity, however, carries its own hazards of the develop-
ment of intervention and in any event the trade associations perform
an important role during a period when such public service is
undeveloped.
As we have noted, standardization of commodities is important
both for the suppression of impurities and imperfections in competition.
Unless the product is homogeneous, pure competition cannot exist.
Similarly, a bewildering array of differentiated goods may so confuse
consumers as to prevent them from exercising their sovereignty in
the market place." 6 Trade associations have played a prominent role
in the standardization and simplification of many types of goods. They
have formulated standards of quality and "simplified" products to
eliminate large numbers of shapes, sizes and models felt to be unneces-
sary. In some instances, associations have "graded" merchandise and
applied certification marks thereto."' As the record of anti-trust
litigation shows, it is possible for groups of competitors to cloak price
fixing and similar activities in the raiment of standardization and
simplification."' For such reasons § 14(d) was inserted in the Lanham
113. Some observers take the position that all price reporting systems tend to
eliminate competition from their very nature. Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trust
Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions, 45 Y.LE L.J. 1339, 1345
(1936); OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 318 (1951).
114. See American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412,
415-6 (1921) (dissenting opinion). See Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-3 (1925) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,
297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936) ; HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 22 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941); LYON
AND ABRAMSON, THE ECoNOmICS OF OPEN PRICE SYSTEMS 88 (1936).
115. MUND, OPEN MARKETS 246 (1948); STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY
AND FREE ENTERPRISE 255 (1951).
116. But see MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMiCS 325 (8th ed. 1920).
117. KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS 193, 196, 198, 201, 225 (TNEC Mono-
graph 24, 1941) ; Hale, Agreements Among Competitors, 33 MINN. L. REv. 331,
362 (1949) ; Agnew, The Movement for Standards for Consumer Goods, 173 ANNALS
60, 66 (1934) ; Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 8,
76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3421, 3428 (1939). Professional and technical societies en-
gage in similar activities. KAIDANOVSKY, supra, at 210, 224.
118. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). See also Hearings before Temporary
National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3420, 3430 (1939);
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Act to provide for cancellation of certification marks if used to restrain
trade or to discriminate against producers." 9 On the whole, however,
there has been widespread acceptance of the desirability of such
standardization programs. Unless used as a cloak for direct restraints
of trade or carried to the extent where consumer sovereignty is effec-
tively suppressed, most observers have found standardization and
simplification to be meritorious.2 In that connection it is interesting
to note that the governmental programs of the same type often lean
heavily upon trade standards previously adopted by private groups.' 2 '
Exchanges:-Unities of time and place are achieved when traders
gather in organized markets. Imperfections can be removed from the
flow of commerce when all trading is focused on a single exchange.
Economists are agreed upon the desirability of such institutions, 22
and in many decisions over the decades the courts have approved
them.'2 Indeed, the courts have permitted members of the exchanges
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 29 (1949); PEARCE, TRADE ASSOCIATION
SuRVEY 84 (TNEC Monograph 18, 1941); Hale, Monopoly and Mobilization: The
Conflict Between Direct Controls and the Antitru .t Laws, 47 NORTHWESTERN U.L.
REv. 606, 631 (1952).
119. 60 STAT. 433 (1946), U.S.C. § 1064(d) (1946) (Lanham Act). See CALL-
MANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 68.3 (1st ed. 1945) ;
Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 323, 343, 352 (1949); Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 35
GEo. L.J. 147, 182 (1947) ; SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1941). An
example of desirable certification is found in KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS
233 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941).
120. Hale, Agreements Among Competitors, 33 MINN. L. REV. 331, 365 (1949);
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 194 (1949); Tag Manufacturers Institute v.
FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 462 (1st Cir. 1949). But cf. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 41 (1930).
121. KAIDANOVSKY, CONSUMER STANDARDS 16 (TNEC Monograph 24, 1941);
LYON, et al., GOVERNxENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 231 (1939); Hearings before Tem-
porary National Economic Committee, Part 8, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3437, 3484 (1939).
See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ewing, 201 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1953).
122. RoBINSON, THE EcoNoMIcs OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 51 (1948) ; Harrod,
Doctrines of Imperfect Competition 48 Q.J. EcoN. 442, 445 (1934) ; SEN. Doc. No.
35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 403 (1941). But see Chamberlin, An Experimental Im-
perfect Market, 56 J. POL. EcoN. 95 (1948). A particularly vigorous advocacy of
organized exchanges will be found in MuND, OPEN MARrcnrs 212, 234-5, 238, 244, 257
(1948). An example of the market place in action is reported in To Market, Tar
Market, 40 FORTUNE 87 (July 1949).
123. In United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S.
611, 619 (1924), it was said: "The usefulness and legality of sales for future delivery,
and of furnishing an Exchange where under well-defined limitations and rules the
business can be carried on, have been fully recognized by this court. . . . The
machinery of such an Exchange has been at times made the means of promoting
corners . . . thereby restraining and obstructing foreign and interstate trade. In
such instances, the manipulators subject themselves to prosecution and indictment
under the Anti-Trust Act. . . . But this is not to hold that such an Exchange with
the facilities it affords for making contracts for future deliveries is itself a combina-
tion and conspiracy thus to restrain . . . trade." See, Anderson v. United States,
171 U.S. 604, 616 (1898) ; Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S.
236, 249 (1905); New York and Chicago Grain and Stock Exchange v. Board of
Trade, 127 Ill. 153, 161, 19 N.E. 855, 858 (1889) ; State v. Duluth Board of Trade,
107 Minn. 506, 521, 121 N.W. 395, 401 (1909). The importance of organized ex-
changes to the economy is recognized in Commodity Exchange Act §§ 3, 4a, 4d, 4e,
19531
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to agree not to trade with non-members and even to fix the rate of
commission which should be charged for dealings in the organized
market. In the early Anderson case, the court examined such an ex-
clusive trade arrangement and found "there is no feature of monopoly
in the whole transaction." 124 In the famous Chicago Board of Trade
case, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote an opinion sustaining a rule of that
body prohibiting a change in the price of grain after the close of trading
and until the exchange opened the following morning." Recent legis-
lation appears to approve such rules of organized exchanges, at least
if governmental supervision be exercised over them. 6
Transactions in restraint of trade can, of course, be carried out
through the facilities of an organized exchange. Similarly, such an
institution may be used as a cloak for price fixing or other undesirable
practices.127  It was, however, disturbing when the Supreme Court of
the United States recently cast doubt on prior favorable decisions.2
That doubt arises from an assertion that the older cases rested upon the
ground that only local commerce was involved. 2 9 The statement was
made in a case involving real estate brokers, who are not, of course,
traders on organized exchanges. Such agents, however, perform es-
sentially the same service as brokers upon stock and grain exchanges.
It is true that an agreement among such brokers looking to the fixing
of commission rates flies in the face of the rule that price fixing is ille-
gal per se under the anti-trust laws. If, however, the informal ex-
changes operated by real estate and similar brokers be properly cred-
ited with the important role they play in diffusing information to both
buyers and sellers," 0 a different result may well follow. Experience
4h, 6(b), 42 STAT. 999-1002 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§2, 5, 6, 9 (1946). Note
that § 4b of that statute is aimed at gambling on organized markets, a practice which
has been suppressed by private exchanges with judicial approval in the past. Moore
v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 252 (1905) (by implication).
124. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898) ; cf. Hopkins v. United
States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
125. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Other illuminating
opinions were prepared in Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d
673 (8th Cir. 1926) ; State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395
(1909). But cf. United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D.
Mass. 1919) ; State v. Wilson, 73 Kan. 334, 80 Pac. 639 (1906).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1946) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1946).
127. See United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S.
611, 619 (1924).
128. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
129. Id. at 492. There is language in Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578,
588 (1898), which supports the recent statement made by the Court. But cf. id. at
592; Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 615-6 (1898); Stafford v. Wallace,
258 U.S. 495, 524 (1922); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1948).
130. See LYON AND AaRAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN PRICE SYSTEMS 9
(1936); ATKINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL ESTATE PRACTICE 291, 295, 309 (1946);
MUND, OPEN MARx Ts 244 (1948).
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appears to indicate that fixing of commission rates on organized ex-
changes is essential to facilitate the fast flow of transactions. In infor-
mal markets similar considerations may apply. Fixing of rates of com-
mission, of course, diverts competition among the brokers into service
channels.131 While in the field of industry as a whole such diversion
may be undesirable, it is entirely possible that buyers and sellers of the
commodities dealt in by brokers benefit from the commission fixing.
In other words, it may be more important for the vendor or purchaser
of real estate to secure service co'petition in the making of a sale or
purchase rather than some small concession from the broker's normal
rate of commission. If that be true, considerable question is cast upon
the merits of cases holding that brokers of real estate, sugar and insur-
ance cannot agree upon rates of commission.11
2
CONCLUSIONS
In the nature of things, we cannot assess the relative importance
of impurities as against imperfections in the total commerce of the
nation. Hence no firm suggestion can be made to a court trying a par-
ticular case as to the relative weight to attach to those two obstacles
to an economic allocation of resources. Within the boundaries of a
single suit, however, it is conceivable that calculations roughly approx-
imating quantitative appraisals might be possible. Economists should
be able to make an informed guess as to the cost of monopolistic fac-
tors in a given situation. Similarly, the expense of continuing those
market imperfections which a trade practice seeks to suppress could be
131. State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 551, 121 N.W. 395, 414
(1909). A vivid illustration of service competition by a real estate broker is
furnished in a direct mail advertising circular published by A. H. Gruetzmacher
& Co. of 29 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago (1953). In that circular the broker offered
to have a picture taken of the owner's premises by a professional photographer and
to mail a brochure containing that photograph to 25,000 prospective purchasers. He
also offered to furnish the picture and a listing of property to 2,500 brokers place
advertisments in the newspapers and render other services all at no cost whatever
to the property owner and at no increase in commission above the standard rate
charged in the city.
132. But cf. United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 817, 903
(S.D.N.Y. 1934), aff'd, 297 U.S. 553, 587-9 (1936). See United States v. South-
eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). A question may arise as to
whether the foregoing reasoning can be applied to the "fair trade" statutes so as to
afford economic justification for those measures. Comment, Resale Price Maintenance
and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 369 (1951) ; Hearings before Anti-
trust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4365, H.R. 4593,
H.R. 4662, H.R. 6367, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). For several reasons it is believed
that the arguments applicable to organized and informal exchanges should not be ex-
tended to all retail trade. "Fair trade" statutes protect retailers who take title to the
goods they sell and thus incur risks in reselling them. Brokers by definition merely
act as agents for the trading parties. Hence there is a marked distinction between
the retail druggist, for example, on the one hand, and the real estate broker on the
other. There are several other reasons why the argument advanced in the text
should not be applied to justify resale price maintenance.
1953]
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appraised in some rough form. If a court were considering, for ex-
ample, the validity of commission fixing by real estate brokers, it would
not be too difficult to make an estimate of the additional expense re-
sulting therefrom. Perhaps more difficulty would be encountered in
assessing the counter-vailing cost of lethargy in service competition.
If, however, markets could be found where commissions had not been
so fixed by agreement among the brokers, testimony as to experience
in those areas might be helpful in assessing the relative merits of the
two systems.
It is submitted that the anti-trust laws cannot be enforced without
taking account of frictions in the market place. A blind-zeal to re-
move all monopoly elements in the economy might well result in a less
efficient allocation of resources than previously obtained.' What we
are urging is, of course, little more than a formalized application of the
familiar rule of reason; 134 and the fact that quantitative standards for
its application may often be lacking cannot excuse a refusal to consider
the impact of judicial action upon the economy as a whole. Extension
of the doctrine of violations per se is not, in other words, a rational ap-
proach to the solution of most anti-trust problems.
133. Compare EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPETrrIoN 30-49 (1949) with NELsoN
AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 56-7 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1941).
134. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. Rav. 1139, 1145, 1156 (1952).
